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Mario B. Lambeite and Julius P. Relampagos**
The Dynamics of Rural Development (DRD) is a three-year research program implemented 
by the Philippine. Institute for Development Studies, (PIDS) funded under the Technical 
Resources Project (TRP), a project grant agreement between the National Economic and 
Development Authority (NEDA) and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), for the 1991-1994. This restarch program is a sequel to earlier research projects on the 
Philippine rural financial market undertaken by PIDS in collaboration with the Agricultural 
Credit Policy Council (ACPC) and the Ohio State University (OSU). PIDS, ACPC, and OSU 
had earlier implemented the Comparative Bank Study (CBS) in 1987 which undertook a detailed 
study on the operations and performance of a sample of rural financial institutions (i.e., rural 
banks, private development banks, and branches of commercial banks), a study on the financial 
patterns of a sample rural households and an exploratory research with a few credit unions. The 
CBS was the first major research project on rural finance PIDS completed in 1988.
in line with efforts of PIDS to promote research undertaldngs on rural financial markets, the 
second research project focusing oh the operations of sample rural credit unions in the country 
was conducted jointly with the OSU. At the same time, the rural savings mobilization 
experiment of a sample of rural banks being undertaken by the ACPC was finalized. Both 
research activities were completed in 1990.
The implementation of die first two research projects was timely for the medium-term review 
and assessment of the extent and success of the 1981 financial reforms undertaken by the 
country, especially in the rural financial sector. Various studies in these projects addressed 
several rural financial market issues and, through policy recommendations, sought to correct 
certain distortions and biases created by existing policies in the Philippine financial system. 
Thus, the research results of both projects produced substantial contribution to the existing 
literature on Philippine rural finance. More importantly, they were used as inputs to policy 
reforms being initiated by the Central Bank and the preparation of several congressional bills.
For the Comparative Bank Study, the first research project, the following studies were 
completed (see Annex 1 for the summary of findings of the individual studies):
♦Prepared for the Consultation Workshop on the Dynamics of Rural Development (DRD) wganized by the Philippine 
Institute for Development Studies, held on August 30-31,1991, at Temate, Cavite. The workshop is part of the Dynamics of Rural 
Development Research Program funded under the Technical Resources Project of the United Stales Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and coursed through the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
♦•Project Director and Assistant Project Director, respectively of the Project Management Office, Dynamics of Rural 
Development Research Program.
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The recent developments taking place in the rural areas (i.e., implementation of agrarian 
reform and rural industrialization policies) will bring about a profound impact on the rural 
sector, in general, and on its financial market, in particular. In this regard, the macroeconomic 
environment and the rural financial market are expected to play a new major role in these efforts 
to pursue rural development. Thus, the implementation'of the Dynamics of Rural Development 
(DRD) research program assumes a timely significance as it is expected to generate data pertinent 
in addressing issues concerning rural development
The TRP-DRD research program has two major thrusts:
— to extend the research program currently being implemented by the Institute to 
include the areas of agrarian reform and rural non-farm enterprises; and
— to expand the capacity of PIDS and other institutions to conduct research, and to 
disseminate the analytical results to decisionmakers to incorporate them into the 
design of new policies, strategies, and projects as well as to researchers for their 
research agenda.
Two major components comprise the TRP-DRD research program: research on the probable 
impact of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) on the Philippine economy; and 
research on the financing of rural non-farm enterprises.
4With regard to the first component, it is essential that a thorough study of the potential 
impacts of CARP on rural productivity and incomes be made before full implementation of the 
reforms, so that appropriate adjustment mechanisms and policies can be put in place to reduce 
and shorten the disruptive impact of such policy. Agrarian reform involves a major restructuring 
in socio-economic relationships, and is thus almost always accompanied by a disruption of the 
traditional systems of delivering inputs, credit, and the marketing of products, to the extent that 
these systems are tied to the operations of the large landholders who will be dispossessed. Thus, 
the government will have to determine where and to what extent the disruptive consequence of 
land reform will likely occur, identify how economic agents will adjust to these disruptions, and 
then take these adjustments into account in designing the measures meant to lessen the effect of 
such disruptions, especially on the credit market In this component crops and industries to be 
covered include coconut, sugar, rice, livestock, and fisheries.
In the second component this research program will generate information needed to analyze 
financial services issues from both the perspective of the financial institutions and the rural non­
farm enterprises. This effort will be part of a larger program by PIDS and A CPC to explore the 
impact of the rural non-farm sector on agricultural production and employment and on regional 
development and vice-versa. It will contribute to an understanding of how the demand for 
financial services by farm and non-farm enterprises in rural areas affects the opportunities and 
need for financial intermediation.
The implementation of the TRP-DRD research program is divided into two phases. Phase I 
deals with the development of the research program calling for the identification of the research 
topics and the preparation/conduct of the state-of-the-art reviews for these individual prospective 
topics as the expected output This phase will be carried out for six months from April to 
September 1991. Fourteen papers are expected to be produced in Phase I. Phase H will be 
devoted for the actual implementation/conduct of the study for the individual research topics 
identified and approved by the Steering Committee during the final stage of Phase I, and the 
publication/dissemination of the research results. Phase II will be carried out from October 1991 
up to March 1994. Ten studies are expected to be produced in Phase II.
Several researchers from different institutions and agencies with expertise in 
macroeconomics, rural development, and finance will assist PIDS in implementing the major 
thrusts of the DRD research program.
This consultation-workshop is the first of a series of seminar- workshops to be conducted 
throughout the duration of the DRD research program. The objectives of this 
consultation-workshop are twofold: to discuss current issues and developments in the rural sector, 
especially those concerning agrarian reform and rural non-farm enterprises; and to identify the 
research gaps and problems that need to be addressed in the formulation of policies related to 
rural development. Thus, the results of this consultation-workshop provide an important input in 
preparing a research agenda for Phase II of the research program which involves the actual 
conduct/implementation of the various studies to be identified based on the results of the 
state-of-the-art reviews.
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COMPARATIVE BANK STUDY 
"Comparative Bank Study: A Background Paper"
by Mario B. Lamberte
Objectives o f the Study
This paper provides a general background to the abovementioned research project The main 
objectives are: (1) to review existing banking regulations; (2) to describe the performance of the 
financial system in the most recent past; (3) to compare the performance of commercial banks 
(KBs), private development banks (PDBs), and rural banks (RBs) by the region; (4) to test the 
"interest rate" and "institution elasticity" hypotheses, using a combination of time series (1983- 
85) and cross-section data (13 regions and three categories of banks, namely KBs, PDBs and 
RBs); and (5) to examine the performance of individual commercial banks.
Findings
In 1980, a package of financial reforms was implemented in the country with the following 
objectives: (1) to increase competitive conditions among banks, and (2) to increase the 
availability of and access to longer term funds. Included among the features of the financial 
reforms are: (1) the creation of universal banks which have expanded commercial banking 
functions; (2) encouraging mergers/consolidations to reduce the number of banks to achieve 
their optimal size; (3) promotion of bank branching which, for the first time, allowed rural banks 
to open branches although limited to the.region where the main branch is located; (4) making the 
reserve requirement uniform iacross different types of short-term deposit liabilities (i.e., deposits 
with maturities of 730 days or less), but not across different types of banks; (5) deregulation of 
the bank interest rates; (6) the phasing out of credit subsidies; and (7) encouraging banks, 
particularly KBs, to increase the share of medium- and long-term loans in the total loan portfolio 
of banks.
However, there were certain regulations that impinge on the promotion of bank branching.
These include: (1) the CB’s policy requiring banks opening up new branches to purchase
five-year special government or Central Bank securities according to service area classification;
and (2) the imposition of the deposit retention scheme which requires banks to lend 50 percent of
the total deposits mobilized by branches of banks in the same service areas.
•
The differential reserve requirement across different types of banks is geared to offset the cost 
advantages enjoyed by bigger banks. The recent experience, however, shows that bigger banks 
bought thrift and rural banks. Thus, they also enjoy such privilege.
During the financial crisis, many of the banks collapsed due to over-dependence on the 
Central Bank rediscounting facilities and poor supervision, not due to cutthroat competition. This 
was specifically true for rural banks which constitute by far the most restricted banking system.
While bank interest rates were deregulated, the cheap rediscounting policy of the Central 
Bank favoring certain economic activities continued. Only in November 1985 did the Central 
Bank shift its emphasis from credit allocation to stabilization functions.
Simultaneous with phasing out credit subsidies is the introduction of risk-reducing guarantee 
schemes in addition to the crop insurance scheme for rice and com. These are the Industrial 
Guarantee Loan Fund (IGLF), Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises (GFSME), 
Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF), and Quedan Financing Program. There are still 
a few special credit programs, however, which are primarily aimed at supplementing the funds of 
the banking system like the DBP-SSS Financing Program, and the Agricultural Loan Fund.
Certain regulations impinge on the intermediation cost The currently high reserve 
requirement, the 25 percent agri/agra loan requirement and the five percent gross receipts (GRT) 
tax are taxes imposed on intermediation. In a competitive environment, all these taxes are 
supposedly absorbed by financial intermediaries. Such environment does not exist in the 
Philippines. So, banks fully pass on this tax burden to borrowers, who pay a rate higher than 
when such intermediation taxes are absent.
The Philippine financial system has been compared with Thailand and Korea. One indicator 
used was the flow of loanable funds using the ratio of the stock of money to gross domestic 
product. The 1980 financial reform undertaken by the Philippines produced a positive effect on 
the ratio. Towards the latter part of 1983, Korea and the Philippines encountered financial 
difficulties. However, the impact on the ratio was more severe in the Philippines than in Korea, 
suggesting that the latter has a more solid financial system.
Another indicator of the performance of the financial system is the competitiveness of the 
banking system and efficiency with which it raises and allocates funds. The increased 
competition among banks was expected to result in the narrowing of the spread between lending 
and deposit rates. Surprisingly, after the financial reforms were implemented, the banks’ spread 
widened, implying that borrowers were paying more when the interest rates started to be 
deregulated.
KBs’ deposit mobilization is more extensive than PDBs and RBs. Likewise, KBs have the 
highest ratio of deposit liabilities to total resources among the three groups of banks. In 1985, 
the loans-to-deposit ratios of KBs in almost all regions were surprisingly below 50 percent It 
should be pointed out that KBs are covered by the deposit retention scheme and thus, the ratio 
should not have gone below 50 percent This suggests the need for stricter enforcement of the 
regulation. Most of the deposit funds of the branches of commercial banks could have gone to the 
NCR since the loan to deposit ratio in this region exceeds 100 percent. PDBs’ and RBs’ 
loan-to-deposit ratios greatly exceed 100 percent in almost all regions and years. Indeed, a 
significant proportion of their loans was supported not by deposits but by borrowings from the 
Central Bank and other government agencies with special credit programs.
The study also attempted to examine the hypotheses concerning elasticity of interest rate and 
institution. The presence of more banking institutions in the regions has apparently a greater 
impact on deposits than high interest rate there. Hus seems reasonable since high interest rate 
means nothing to people in the provinces if access to financial institutions is nil.
7The study also examined the demand for deposit instruments of KBs, PDBs, and RBs. 
Deposits with KBs are found to increase alongside with an increment in the interest rate on 
deposits. This is not however the case with PDBs and R&s. This is far from surprising since 
many depositors shifted their deposits from small to bigger banks and from thrift and rural banks 
to branches of commercial banks perceived to be relatively more stable during the financial crisis 
period. The empirical results also reveal that the number of offices has a significant positive 
effect on deposits with KBs, PDBs, and RBs.
8"Funds Transfer Operations: Boon or Bane to the 
Viability of Rural Financial Intermediaries?"
by Julius P. Relampagos and Mario B. Lamberte
Objectives of the Study
The study addressed the following:
— what is the structure of funds transfer operations of rural-based branches of banks - 
is it from one branch to another or is it from one branch to the head office?
— what factors determine the volume of funds transferred from one branch to another 
of the same bank?
— what is the impact of funds transfer operations on the savings mobilization efforts 
of rural-based financial intermediaries?
Findings
Funds flow directly or indirectly from branches operating in the rural areas to the urban-based 
head offices, specifically the National Capital Region. For branches in the Visayas and 
Mindanao, surplus funds are channelled to the area/regional office which, in turn, moves them to 
the head office. Branches operating in areas near the head office transferred excess funds directly 
to the head office through an armored vehicle.
Over 80 percent of the total KB sample transferred excess funds to their head offices in Metro 
Manila in 1986. This implies that rural-based branches of commercial banks are a potential 
source of funds by the head offices. On the other hand, 73 percent of the total PDB sample 
transferred funds to their head offices in the same year. However, a majority of the PDB 
branches also received funds from head offices.
One-third of the sample branch managers considered the poor viable loan demand in rural 
areas as one factor why their branches accumulated excess balances. This perception is due to 
the fact that bank branches prefer to accommodate large loans, while most production loan 
requirements in the rural areas are small. This is reflected in the relatively high minimum loan 
size requirement imposed by bank branches. Enforcement of the minimum loan size requirement 
disqualifies small borrowers. This requirement suggests that KBs and PDBs are oriented toward 
the urban commercial sector where large borrowers engage in large agribusiness, manufacturing, 
and trading operations.
Other branch managers claimed the transfer of surplus funds to the head office is done to 
comply with bank management policies. Implied in this result is the control in the 
decision-making functions of the branches with regard to the use of the financial resources being 
mobilized. The findings show that KB branches are more regulated than PDB branches. This 
regulation comes in the form of determining the amount of funds to be transferred and the
amount of loans to be approved at the branch level. Head offices determine the amount of funds 
to be transferred from die branch to the head office in the case of KBs, while branch managers of 
PDBs make such decision. In terms of branch’s discretion tp approve loans, KB branches appear 
more restricted than their PDB counterparts.
The decision of a branch to transfer or borrow funds to or from another branch is determined 
by the lending rates, transfer pool rates, deposit interest rates, and transaction cost on lending. 
This was tested empirically where significant correct signs were obtained. In the empirical 
model, the ratio of net transfers to total deposits of the sample branches is used as the dependent 
variable. The results sfiow that a higher transfer pool rate relative to the .lending rate has a 
positive effect on the amount of funds transferred. Likewise, an increment in the deposit interest 
rates offered to the depositors increases the volume of deposits mobilized and, consequently, the 
amount of funds transferred. Lastly, a high transactions cost on lending induces "selective" 
lending among branches, resulting in the accumulation of surplus funds to be transferred.
In the savings mobilization empirical model, the transfer pool rate was used as a variable to 
determine the impact of funds transfer operations on deposit-taking activity of branch banks. The 
variable yielded significant positive sign, implying a favorable effect of the funds transfer 
operations on the deposit mobilization efforts of the branches of commercial banks and private 
development banks.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The availability of funds transfer mechanism among branch banks provides an outlet for 
surplus funds at the branch level. Such mechanism helps intensify branch bank’s efforts at rural 
savings mobilization. In spite of the seasonal funds flow in rural areas, branches worry not a bit 
about having possible outlets for deposit funds; they can always resort to moving them to other 
branches faced with high level of demand for credit in their service areas.
In the light of the results of this study, certain government policies need to be re-examined. 
Specifically, the deposit retention scheme directly works against the objective of banks, 
especially in the branch banking system, to maximize profit or net returns on present cash flows 
through better allocation of financial resources from surplus to deficit branches. Banks ought to 
be allowed to direct funds to the most profitable uses, or obtain funds from the cheapest source 
whenever they experience temporary liquidity problems. Likewise, the deposit retention may 
work against the efforts of banks to mobilize rural savings as savers will not be offered attractive 
deposit interest rates.
That most bank branches in the rural areas transferred their excess funds to the urban centers 
is an open invitation to fine-tune policies so as to effect economy-wide structural changes. These 
include removing the deposit retention policy and introducing a more liberal branching policy to 
attract more banks to expand their rural banking services.
10
The absence of funds transfer operations in the unit banking system should be considered 
seriously in framing government policies which aim to increase credit supply in the 
rural-agricultural sector and, at the same time, to ensure the viability of rural-based financial 
institutions. Perhaps, the appropriate policy here is to encourage unit banks to strengthen 
linkages among; themselves and/or with branches of KBs and PDBs in other areas to effect 
interbank funds transfer operations. However, the agri/agra requirement and deposit retention 
policies impede such development Also, the single borrower’s limit set at 15 percent of the 
bank’s unimpaired capital and surplus can hinder unit banks with excess funds from lending to 
deficit unit banks or branch banks, as the case may be. Thus, removing such restrictive banking 
policies to allow unit banks to effect funds transfers would greatly benefit them.
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"Credit Rationing Under a Deregulated Financial System"
by Ma. Lucila A. Lapar and Douglas H. Graham
Objective o f the Study
The main objective of this study is to provide empirical support for the continued existence of 
credit rationing in a deregulated financial system. This study will look into the existence of credit 
rationing among banks in the rural financial markets of the Philippines, and determine the 
rationing mechanisms used by each type of bank (RBs, PDBs, and KBs) in allocating credit. The 
intensity and incidence of credit rationing among these banks will also be compared.
There are three stages of rationing pointed out in this study: screening stage; formal 
processing stage; and quantity rationing stage. The screening and acceptance/rejection rationing 
behavior of branches of KBs and PDBs is more restrictive than those for RBs as seen in their 
respective approval rates. These differences in the degree of screeening and rationing may be 
due to operational differences among these banks. Among these differences would be the fact 
that RB managers generally know their customers well and are knowledgeable about the kinds of 
activities for which their clients are borrowing. Thus, the greater incidence of screening and loan 
rejection for KBs and PDBs arises out of their relative bias for greater prudence and risk 
aversion, combined with less institutional concern for engaging in local loan activity.
The rationing behavior of the three types of banks is influenced by factors such as the 
capacity to pay, bank-client relationship, and collateral. RBs exhibit a strong bias towards a well- 
developed bank-client relationship in their rationing behavior.
The data on quantity rationing among PDBs and RBs strongly suggest that the degree of 
quantity rationing among these two banks differ because of loan and borrower characteristics 
considered by each bank. Quantity rationing or reducing the amount applied for can take place 
only when the bank discovers certain additional characteristics of the borrower, e.g., loan 
delinquencies with other banks, that warrant such action.
Two types of models were estimated to test for factors that explain the quantity-rationing 
behavior of PDBs and RBs: quantity-rationing model; and qualitative-response model. A 
positive sign implies less rationing and a negative sign, more restrictive rationing. In terms of 
quantity rationing model, for RBs, the variables interest rate, area of land, and the number of 
dependents yielded significant positive signs, while the variables loan maturity and cash crops 
yielded significant negative signs. For PDBs, the variable collateral-loaii ratio yielded significant 
positive sign, while the variables loan maturity and number of dependents produced significant 
negative signs. In the results of the qualitative response model, borrowers of longer term loans 
are more likely to be rationed than those of shorter term loans in the case of RBs. For PDBs, a 
borrower with a high income level and a longer term loan has a higher probability of being 
rationed. This is consistent with the known practice of PDBs requiring reasonably well-off 
borrowers to participate in longer term loan financing through larger equity contributions
12
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The results of this study have established empirical support for the existence of credit 
rationing in the rural financial markets. These results confirm the theoretical argument that credit 
rationing is still possible in a deregulated financial system characterized by imperfect 
information. In the Philippines, this imperfect market for information was reinforced by the 
growing risks of financial activity in the recessionary environment of the 1980s.
The results of this study also suggest that market-oriented credit policies (with appropriately 
realistic interest rates) are likely to be similarly limited in expanding access to small or marginal 
borrowers due to the constraints imposed on the system through imperfect information. Thus, 
measures which can help reduce risks and minimize the costs of acquiring information may have 
to be initiated. These include the use of non-government organizations (NGOs) or private 
volunteer organizations (PVOs) to sort out and prepare a roster of "good" small farmer clientele 
for banks. The existing guarantee programs which can help reduce the risks of banks may also 
have to be streamlined and efficiently implemented to better serve their target beneficiaries. To 
some extent, promoting rural credit unions creates the potential for an institutional actor that 
could serve a large number of this marginal clientele.
A final issue merits comment in this conclusion, namely, the troublesome link between the 
findings on credit rationing in this study and the prospective land reform. The viability of rural 
financial institutions will be affected through the declining value of the collateral assets (i.e., 
mortgaged property) they have included in their ongoing loan contracts and the foreclosed land 
assets they hold in their portfolio. In the former case, farmers owning more than the retention 
limit may stop repaying the bank on their loans secured by these land titles on the assumption 
they will lose their land through expropriation.
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"The Analysis of Saving Behavior: 
The Case of Rural Households in the Philippines"
by Jocelyn Alma Rodriguez and Richard L. Meyer
Objectives o f the Study
This study attempts to examine the saving behavior of Filipino rural households. The specific 
objectives are: (1) to verify the capacity of the rural households in the Philippines to save; (2) to 
determine the factors that influence saving behavior, and (3) to examine the forms in which 
savings are held and identify the factors that influence financial savings.
Findings
An average household saved about P6,901 during the period and positive marginal 
propensities to save (MPSs) ranging from 58 percent to 89 percent were estimated for groups of 
households classified according to income group, occupation and farm size. The professionals 
posted the highest MPSs (89%) followed by the pension-eamers and recipients of income from 
abroad (84%). The farmers registered an MPS of 66 percent. The farmers were further classified 
into six farm-size groups. No distinct trend in MPS with respect to farm size could be 
determined.
There were three savings models estimated in this study. Saving, as the dependent variable, 
is defined as the residual left after deducting consumption from income. Specifically, saving was 
regressed on current, permanent and transitory incomes, wealth, dependency ratio, education, 
occupation, age, and transaction costs. In model 1, the variables current income, wealth, and 
occupation yielded significant expected signs, supporting the hypotheses that these variables have 
direct 'and positive impact on saving. In model 2, permanent and transitory incomes yielded 
significant positive signs with a coefficient for transitory larger than permanent income. This 
supports Friedman’s hypothesis that people tend to save more out of transitory income. In model 
3, the variables permanent and transitory incomes, occupation, and dependency ratio yielded 
significant correct signs.
Physical assets dominated the saving and asset portfolios of rural households. The residential 
house and lot accounted for the largest percentage, followed by farmland, consumer durables. By 
type of occupation, household savings also appear in the form of physical assets. Except for 
professionals, a very small proportion of household savings is in the form of financial assets 
(such as bank deposits or non-bank deposits) for other types of occupation.
Two models were formulated and tested in order to examine the determinants of the demand 
for financial assets. In model 1 using bank and non-bank deposits as the dependent variable, 
permanent income, transitory income, and interest rate on time deposit variables yielded 
significant correct signs. The same results were obtained in model 2B, using only bank deposits 
as the dependent variable. In both models, transaction costs appear to be an insignificant 
variable, affecting household decision to save in the form of bank deposits.
14
Policy Implications and Recommendations
Measures to spur rural savings are called for, since income appears to be the most important 
economic variable affecting such savings. There is need for income-increasing incentives to 
encourage farm investment such as facilitating the introduction of improved technology, 
providing appropriate farm support services and long-term measures toward the creation of 
employment opportunities. Well-designed rural savings mobilization programs should be 
implemented to further harness the potential for voluntary savings. Since more are saved out of 
transitory incomes, spurts in income are therefore highly susceptible to savings opportunities and 
incentives. Likewise, carrying out a widespread population growth reduction program, raising 
educational standards, and implementing market-oriented interest rate policies will help increase 
the volume of rural savings.
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"The Demand for Funds Among Agricultural Households 
in the Philippines"
by Raquel Clar de Jesus and Carlos E. Cuevas
Objective o f the Study
This paper addresses the interdependency of farm household decisions by quantifying a 
demand for credit that considers both the household’s loan needs and its overall liquidity 
position. Several key issues surrounding the interdependent decisions approach are discussed 
here. The controversy about simultaneity in farm household models is reviewed. A preview of 
the linkages between different components of the household’s liquidity management is presented. 
The variables likely to influence the demand for funds under interdependency of farm decisions 
are discussed.
Findings
The asset structures of the farm families indicate an apparent accumulation of fixed and 
intermediate assets and shows lesser amounts of the more liquid financial assets. Although 
household possessions are mostly held in fixed forms, an important proportion of farm 
households maintains assets in more liquid form such as livestock and poultry. These assets can 
provide households with funds during troughs or emergencies.
Landowners maintain more farm assets and consumer durables with values not as large as 
those kept by leaseholders. Landowners have the strongest incentive to increase income from 
production through increased investment in the farm. Because of the temporary nature of a 
leasehold contract, leaseholders tend to hold higher values of non-land farm assets and consumer 
durables.
Most of the savers are small landowners and share tenants. The information on landowners 
confirms the observation they face incentives to produce more and subsequently save more 
because they own the land from which their income is derived. In the case of share tenants, they 
enjoy the same protection provided by law to landowners. Thus, the tenancy arrangement does 
not restrain them from producing and saving.
Despite relatively higher nominal and effective interest rates in the informal market, the data 
show more loans are provided by informal lenders than banks and other formal lending 
institutions. The smaller size of an informal loan relative to a formal loan may explain the higher 
effective rate in the informal sector. Small loans, sourced mostly from die informal sector, bear 
higher transactions costs, making the effective rate inversely proportional to the loan size.
Full owners and amortizing owners of land borrow larger amounts than leaseholders and 
share tenants. Full owners also derive bigger loans from formal sources while amortizing owners 
prefer informal sources. This reflects the banks’ bias towards collateralized loans since the 
fully-owned farmlands serve as acceptable collateral.
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The empirical analysis specifies a simultaneous equations model comprised by the interest 
rate (price determination) equation (supply side) and the demand for funds equation (demand 
side).
Policy Implications ojid Recommendations
From the empirical analysis, on the demand side, membership in farm organizations emerged 
as one of the significant variables that reduce the demand for funds. This suggests the ability of 
the farm organizations to finance the needs of its farmer-members and the relative efficiency of 
farm organizations in providing financing and marketing services to members. Thus, 
strengthening the existing viable cooperatives through access to financing deserves positive 
attention.
The significant positive consequence of effective interest rates reflects the interplay of 
external borrowing and internal financing in the total demand for funds by the farm household. 
When effective interest rates rise and farm operations are threatened by low levels of external 
financing due to an increase in interest rate, farm households can supplement inadequate funds 
with external lending, financial assets, or consumer durables. Hence, the farm family can 
maintain relative stability in production, income and consumption despite unfavorable weather 
conditions and price fluctuations.
The variables incorporating loan purpose, education, previous bank patronage and 
borrowings were found to be the most important variables determining effective interest rates on 
loans to agricultural households.
The study supports the interdependent approach analyzing farm households’ demand for 
funds. Therefore, the approach on rural finance by policymakers should be comprehensive and 
not limited to "agricultural credit programs". The policies of the government should therefore be 
geared towards the enhancement of funds flow. Policies and programs which increase the cash 
flow of the households, such as risk-reduction programs, the provision of off-farm income and 
employment opportunities and other measures that will increase the cash holdings of farm 
families and increase the financial flows in the community are called for. Likewise, in an 
environment characterized by fragmented markets in developing countries, funds flow may be 
enhanced through measures reducing fragmentation. These may be policies allowing freedom of 
movement (i.e., free market forces), lower transactions costs and minimum market constraints 
(financial liberalization). Priority must be given to efficient handling of goods and services, 
particularly farm support services like irrigation, infrastructure, etc.
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"Costs of Agricultural Credit in the Philippines: 
"The Short-Run Effects of Interest Rate Deregulation"
by Irma C. Corrales and Carlos E. Cuevas
Objective o f the Study
This paper analyzes the agricultural credit scenario prevailing in the Philippines at the time 
of the major deregulation of interest rates in 1984. The study focuses on the institutional costs of 
lending to agriculture and on immediate effects deregulation bore on these costs. Costs of 
lending to non- agricultural sectors and similar studies in other selected countries are used as 
frames of reference in the analysis.
Findings
The problems in agricultural credit may be classified broadly into: limitations on the supply 
of formal credit to agriculture and weakness in the institutional financial infrastructure or 
agricultural credit With regards to the first problem, agricultural financing has developed a 
marked dependence on the rediscount window of the Central Bank to a much larger extent than 
the non-agricultural sector. Since rediscounting is subject to limitations imposed by domestic 
credit ceilings, the tightening of this window in 1984 in response to economic and financial 
difficulties had seriously disabled agricultural credit. On the problem of institutional weaknesses, 
no single institution is designated to play a lead role in agriculture and catalyze financing support 
on a wider scale. The agriculture financing performance would seem to indicate the neglect of 
the sector among public and private institutions, where agriculture credit formed a minor stream 
in their lending portfolio. This "neglect" is viewed in the context of the social infrastructure and 
policy environment for agriculture development which did not favor investments in the sector.
In July 1981, as part of an overall package of economic liberalization reforms, a floating 
interest rate policy was adopted in the Philippines. While removal of ceilings on all types of 
deposits and loans with maturities of over two years were immediately effected, ceilings on 
short-term loans remained in place until January 1983. In March 1984, the Central Bank (CB) 
realigned its lending rate to banks and end-users under its rediscount window to the M a nila 
Reference Rate (MRR system). Thus, for the first time, floating rates were adopted for supervised 
and non-supervised agricultural credits as well as for non-traditional exports, cottage industry 
loans, and other special programs. The sharp rise in rates made the CB window a more 
expensive source relative to deposit funds.
Lending costs ^ of agricultural loans were greatly affected by deregulation in all banks except 
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). The main factor explaining this effect is the increase in cost 
of funds. The cost of funds rose substantially more for agricultural loans. Even though the share 
of costs of funds in total lending costs pre-deregulation was smaller for agricultural than for 
non-agricultural loans, this factor was able to offset the differential increase in cost of funds only 
in the case of the LBP. These results suggest the realignment of rediscount rates affected by
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relatively more agricultural lending than non-agricultural loans. Banks tended to rely more upon 
cheap rediscount funds in their lending to agriculture than they did for operations with other 
sectors. But on the other hand, the six to sevenfold increase in rediscount rates implemented in 
1984 generated specific increases in costs of funds much larger for agricultural loans than for 
loans to other sectors due to their heavier reliance upon rediscount funds. As a result, overall 
lending costs to agriculture increased more than the cost of lending to other sectors.
The bank most affected by deregulation was the Philippine National Bank (PNB). Heavy 
reliance on rediscount funds pre- deregulation determined that the specific increase in cost of 
funds for this bank was highest of all banks in the sample.
Net returns for agricultural and non-agricultural loans appear to have improved with the 
adoption of the floating rate system for all types of loans. During the post-deregulation period, 
however, positive returns were experienced by all institutions except the Development Bank of 
the Philippines (DBP), in at least one type of loan activity. Overall, considering the entire loan 
portfolio of banks, all of them except DBP and rural banks were able to realize gains with the 
lifting of ceilings on interest rates for all types of loans.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
Lagged effects of deregulation, affecting the non-interest components of lending costs, 
remain to be investigated. More flexible interest rates should have allowed reductions in costs of 
loan administration and risk expenses, essentially through substitution effects. However, the 
period post-deregulation has been one of economic recession, a factor that increases risk and 
possibly default rates. This may tend to increase explicit risk expenses (e.g., via litigation fees), 
and costs of administration due to the need for more careful screening of loan applications. 
Therefore, the net effect of deregulation on these non-interest components of lending rates should 
be investigated, controlling for the effects of overall economic perfomance.
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"Rural Deposit Mobilization in the Philippines, 1977-1986 "
by Rhenee Blanco and Richard L. Meyer
Objective o f the Study
This paper aims to document and describe rural deposit mobilization in the Philippines in 
light of recent government attempts to reduce the urban bias of financial development. The 
period covered in this analysis is 1977-1986.
Findings
The factors considered important in determining rural deposits may be categorized as 
follows: scope of opportunities for financial asset holdings; incentives for savers; and 
opportunities and incentives to save.
In 1977-1986, compared to urban areas, the rural areas represented the largest share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) and population, and the largest number of banking offices, but a sparser 
bank density ratio and over 40 percent of the rural municipalities had no bank office at all. 
Efforts to increase access to rural banking facilities essentially failed during this period as shown 
by the recent decrease in rural banking offices and an increase in the bank density ratio. In spite 
of having 70 percent of the banking offices, the rural areas represented less than 20 percent of 
total bank assets and a declining share of bank loans averaging about 20 percent for 1977-1986.
The relation among growth rates of real GDP, bank deposits and loans was analyzed. The 
overall period was broken into two subperiods divided at 1981 because completion of interest 
rate deregulation on deposit instruments occurred that year. During the first period, the growth 
rates in GDP, deposits and loans were positive, with the urban rates relatively higher than the 
rural rates. During the second period, all growth rates were negative in both the rural and urban 
areas but there were important differences. The rate of decline in deposits was slower but the 
decline in loans was much faster in rural areas than in urban areas, thereby causing the 
rural-to-urban transfer of funds. One explanation to this was the fact that the interest rate paid on 
government certificates was very high so it is reported that some banks shifted part of their 
portfolio out of loans into these certificates. On the deposit side, it is clear that compared to 
urban areas, rural deposits did not grow with the prosperity of the 1970s nor did they decline 
alongside the recession of the 1980s.
Two additional financial deepening measures of loan:GDP and deposit:GDP ratios are 
presented. The decline in the loan: GDP ratio in both urban and rural areas after 1983 implies 
that self- finance and, most likely, informal finance played increasingly important roles in 
financing rural economic activities. A different picture emerged with deposits. The decline in 
deposit: GDP ratio during the recession was slower than would have been predicted by the path 
of the increase observed during the expansionary period.
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Policy Implications and Recommendations
Governmental efforts to expand the access of the rural population to financial services 
resulted in an expansion of rural banking offices up to 1983 when they exceeded 2,600 units, but 
began to decline afterwards.
The rural deposit: GDP ratio continued to increase in the 1980s despite a decline in rural 
banking offices and in per capita GDP. Several factors lie behind this result such as the increment 
in the real rate of return earned on deposits, changes in income distribution, the effect of learning 
the banking habit, and more aggressive deposit mobilization by banks.
Past emphasis on encouraging rural banking through heavy subsidies and easy access to 
government funds may have discouraged lending institutions, especially RBs, from aggressively 
pursuing deposit accounts. The regulated interest rate structure along with high inflation may 
have also been a disincentive. The current contraction in rural banking offices is a disappointing 
development because of the increase in depositor transaction costs that may occur when 
accessibility is reduced. In spite of a long history of government efforts, a considerable urban 
bias in the financial system still exists.
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"Borrower Transaction Costs and Credit Rationing 
in Rural Financial Markets: The Philippine Case"
by Virginia G. Abiad, Douglas H. Graham and Caiios E. Cuevas
Borrower transaction costs, the main concern of this study, comprise the actual cash outlay 
and the opportunity cost of time spent in applying for, securing and repaying a loan. The longer 
the time taken to evaluate and process a loan, the greater the transaction costs for the borrower. 
Lengthening of processing time is a common tool of credit rationing.
Objectives o f the Study
This study looks at the role of borrower transaction costs in rural financial markets (RFMs) 
in credit rationing. More specifically, its objectives are: to quantify borrower transaction costs; to 
identify the factors that determine and are determined by the level of transaction costs; and to 
determine the role of transaction costs as a credit rationing mechanism in RFMs, during the 
period of interest rate regulation and after the deregulation of interest rates. The following 
questions which operationalize the above objectives are addressed:
— What is the magnitude of borrower transaction costs?
— How do borrower transaction costs affect borrower demand for and access to 
credit?
— What are the determinants of these ttansaction costs?
— Is credit rationing through transaction costs relatively more widespread and 
important when interest rates are restricted than when they are deregulated?
Findings
The three largest expenses (cash outlay) incurred by a borrower in the process of applying 
and receiving his loan were fees (43%), transportation (29%) and food (22%). Of the opportunity 
cost of time, about two-thirds was due to time spent in the bank premises; the rest was due to 
time travelling to and from the bank. Rural bank borrowers incurred lower peso transaction costs 
than no*vrural bank borrowers.
The empirical results of the study show that transaction costs are an important determinant of 
loan demand. The results indicate that transaction costs, as one component of the cost borrowing, 
may be a more important determinant of loan demand than the explicit interest rate, at least in a 
rural-based community. Other determinants of loan demand found statistically significant 
include: (1) the year of the loan (regulated or deregulated period) which is negative; (2) the area 
of land owned which is positive; and (3) the level of education which is also positive. The 
negative sign for the variable Year shows that loan demand was greater in the regulated than in 
the deregulated period. This may indicate that the decline in transaction costs occurring with 
deregulation was probably smaller in magnitude compared to the increase in interest costs due to
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liberalization. As a result, the total cost of borrowing (interest rate plus transaction costs) was 
higher in the deregulated period.
The empirical results also show that two significant factors affect transaction costs: type of 
bank and distance to the bank. The dummy variable for bank shows that transaction costs are 
higher for rural banks than for non-rural banks. This could be due to the large amount of 
supervised loans handled by the rural banks, which carried with them highly time-consuming 
screening and procedural requirements. On the other hand, the dummy variable for Distance has 
a positive coefficient, implying that borrowers who live farther from the bank will have higher 
transaction cost.
Transaction cost was found regressive in impact in both regulated and deregulated periods. 
Small borrowers are therefore penalized by an additional "tax" on borrowing over and above the 
interest rate, at rates proportionally greater than those paid by medium and large borrowers. The 
regressive nature of transaction cost was also confirmed after getting the proportion of transaction 
costs to the nominal interest rate. In both the regulated and deregulated periods, transaction costs 
as a percentage of nominal interes rate is seen to be higher for small loans than for large loans. 
This regressive trend remains high on the deregulated period, with the tax on small loans greater 
than that on medium and large loans by 164 percent and 2,412 percent, respectively. One would 
have expected this regressive incidence to be reduced during the period of deregulation. But this 
did not occur.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
Three major conclusions are drawn in the study. First, transaction costs play an important 
role in the demand for credit and in rationing credit among borrower classes. Second, lifting 
interest rate restrictions decreased the absolute level of transaction costs in the deregulated 
period, but the change was not statistically significant, indicating that some barriers still may 
prevent its full effect. Third, transaction costs in the Philippines as elsewhere, have a regressive 
impact on borrowers.
To increase the efficiency of financial intermediation, steps are required to minimize 
transaction costs for borrowers and lenders. One measure concerns streamlining the information 
gathering procedures, particularly those complying with Central Bank requirements. This is 
especially true for supervised and special credit programs channeled through the rural banks with 
substantial amount of processing and documentation that goes into the loan process of these 
banks. The burden of streamlining the documentation process should fall on the government, 
specifically the Supervision and Examination sections of the Central Bank. Another step is the 
provision of more roads, bridges and other improvements in rural transportation which can help 
reduce transaction costs in travelling to and from the bank. A solution to the problem of the low 
accessibility of banks and the low bankability of farmers, is the promotion of linkages between 
banking institutions and self-help groups (SHGs) to reduce the transaction cost of rural finance to 
marginal clientele. The SHG solution makes bankable the previously non-bankable farmer 
through his membership with SHG. The transaction costs for the borrower and the lending and 
information costs for the lenders, under such an arrangement, would be significantly lower, and 
the risk the small borrower will be rationed in favor of the big borrower is minimized.
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"Guarantee Schemes: An Alternative to the Supervised 
Credit Program"
by Marife Magno and Richard L. Meyer
Objective o f the Study
The paper examines the effectiveness of the credit guarantee programs in increasing the 
amount of credit for agriculture and indigenous industries. Specifically, the following issues will 
be addressed:
— Do guarantee programs lead to additionality in agricultural lending?
— Do guarantee piugrams contribute to small loans?
— Do guarantee programs encourage banks to use their own funds?
— Do guarantee programs reduce the cost of lending to banks?
— How cost effective are the guarantee programs?
The study focuses on four existing guarantee programs of the government — Guarantee Fund 
for Small and Medium Enterprises (GFSME); Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund (IGLF); 
Quedan Guarantee Program (QGP); and Crop Insurance Program (CIP).
Findings
For GFSME, IGLF, and QGP, the amount of guaranteed loans has been increasing in real 
terms in 1984-1986. The bulk of loans guaranteed came from KBs, followed by PDBs and RBs. 
This is not surprising, since KBs represented most of the accredited banks. Under the GFSME 
and IGLF programs, average loan size falls within the PlM-P2Mi bracket Similarly, under the 
QGP, loans from the Fanners Group (FG) have become unpopular among banking institutions, 
while loans for Food Traders and Processors (FTP) and Market Retailers (MRP) have been 
increasing. These findings suggest the preference of banks for fairly large-sized loans.
In terms of repayment performance, the GFSME and QGP seem to be doing quite well, 
boasting a repayment rate of more than 90 percent IGLF repayment performance is not as 
impressive as GFSME and QGP as repayment rates average only about 50 percent The success 
of the guarantee programs depends to a certain extent on the ability of the implementing agencies 
to sustain their financial viability and credibility. The costs incurred in operating the schemes 
give some indications of their overall performance.. Among the guarantee programs, the IGLF 
has the least cost per peso incurred which amounted to P0.019, followed by CIP (P0.050), and 
then GFSME (P0.11). GFSME, however, registered the highest income among the programs due 
to the good repayment rates.
Even though the volume of guaranteed loans was increasing in real terms, guaranteed 
agricultural loans represented only an average share of 2.8 percent to the total agricultural loans
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granted by the banking institutions. Among the banks, PDBs have the highest share of 
guaranteed loans in their loan portfolio followed by RBs. Nonetheless, the increase in the 
amount of guaranteed loans suggests a positive attitude of banks towards guarantee programs. 
However, this increase vis-a-vis a declining share of agricultural loans to the total loan portfolio 
of banking institutions indicates no net addition to loan granted to the agricultural sector. A 
substitution must have occurred. Unfortunately, there is no information on agricultural loans 
granted by banking institutions from their own funds or agricultural loans rediscounted to 
determine whether banks have been using the guarantee programs as a "liquidity window".
A rough way of determining the extent of utilization of bank funds is to compare the volume 
of agricultural loans with the deposits mobilized by banks. Despite the increase in real deposits, 
the share of agricultural loans to deposits was declining on an annual average of 12 percent from 
1981-1986. This implies that the program has not succeeded in encouraging banks to lend their 
own funds to priority sectors of the government, in particular to agriculture. Thus, there are 
indications that banks have viewed these programs more as a source of additional loanable funds 
than a risk-reducing mechanism for loans from their own funds.
Various problems have been encountered in operating the guarantee schemes. The most 
common problem cited is the longer time spent in servicing guaranteed loans due to cumbersome 
and voluminous requirements such as: (1) the requirements for feasibility studies, project plans, 
audited financial statements, etc.; (2) the mandate from the Central Bank or the Guarantee Board 
to closely supervise guaranteed loans due to a greater possibility of credit being diverted to other 
uses; (3) the assurance that the loans accepted by banks will be approved by the Guarantee Board 
and, thus, the need to abide by the rules and regulations of the Board; and (4) the risk of borrower 
default. On the other hand, there are benefits to banks participating in these guarantee programs. 
The most common is that guarantee programs portray an image of stability to the bank. This is so 
because accredited banks are chosen based on rigorous banking criteria which include; no 
arrearages with the Central Bank and that the arrearages on total loans outstanding should not be 
greater than 10 percent; and no deficiencies in reserves on deposit liabilities and must have a 
sound and efficient management.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
As a whole, guarantee schemes have not significantly improved the amount of credit to 
agriculture. At least, the schemes succeeded in encouraging banks to participate in the program. 
Credit guarantee programs can only effectively support agriculture and indigenous industries 
under the following conditions; (1) banks as well as borrowers are willing to participate in the 
schemes; (2) banks use their own funds for on-lending; (3) the extent of bank participation is not 
limited to satisfying the requirements of the program or boosting their viability; (4) the program 
is able to cater to their intended clientele; and (5) guarantee programs can have enough income to 
cover their costs. Moreover, guarantee programs will successfully prod banks to voluntarily 
increase their loan portfolio if the overall costs — i.e. risk- related and administrative — decline. 
Enhancing borrowers’ credit worthiness is an important means in reducing these costs.
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Because of stringent accreditation procedures, only KBs are likely to meet the accreditation 
criteria. Not surprisingly most loans under the guarantee programs are fairly large-sized since 
many accredited banks are KBs more familiar with the large urban-based industries. This runs 
counter to the objective of guarantee programs to cater to small borrowers or rural-based 
industries.
The findings demonstrate the difficulty of effectively "pushing" credit to priority sectors in 
spite of huge resources spent over the years in interest subsidies, rediscounting schemes and now 
guarantee schemes. One wonders if more wouldn’t have been accomplished if such resources 
were diverted to remove obstacles discouraging lenders from serving this clientele. These include 
the lack of information about expected commodity prices, poor or non-existent information 
about the indebtedness and post repayment record of prospective borrowers, underdeveloped 
markets for farm input and output
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"Comparative Management Structure and Institutional Performance in 
Rural Banking Institutions"
by Cesar G. Saldafla
Objective of the Study
This study intends to describe and evaluate the observed management structure, policies and 
practices of three major types of banking organizations operating in the rural areas. The results 
are designed to contribute to a better understanding of how government policies and market 
conditions determine the management setup of these institutions and influence their operating and 
financial performance.
Findings
The great disparity in asset size and relative importance of each banking function accounts for 
organization structure differences. An extensive branch structure for commercial banks can also 
lead to differences in managerial authority compared to unit banks like RBs and PDBs with less 
branches in far-flung places.
Unit banks can be expected to maintain more organizational levels compared to branch 
banks. Unlike unit banks, branches of commercial banks can maintain common support services 
at the central office or regional level. Well-developed operating guidelines may also allow KB 
branches to operate with minimal supervision.
KB branch managers are allowed higher loan approval limits than the PDB managers, 
although the latter’s limits are not too far behind. Disregarding other factors, higher loan 
approval limits correspond to a "decentralized" set-up. Factors such as better knowledge of local 
conditions, availability of centrally administered guidelines and faster or more personal service 
are some reasons for allowing PDB and KB branch managers more discretion on loans.
The nature of deposit campaigns depends on the rural financial intermediary (RFI) type. KBs 
anchor their campaigns on a motivated internal bank staff by giving them incentives to contact 
more people and enlist them as depositors. On the other hand, KB and PDB branches’ campaigns 
are comparatively more customer-oriented, usually with raffle prizes to depositors and TIPID 
movement schemes. Most RB and PDB deposit campaigns are initiated by the branch but for KB 
branches, the mandate comes from the head office.
There is segmentation in the loans market of RFIs reflecting a difference in loans market 
targets or clientele across RFI types. Personal visits/contacfe by the bank staff are regarded by the 
RFIs as more effective than posters, souvenirs and giveaways in advertising loan services.
The importance of loan collection is emphasized by all RFIs; thus, incentives in the form of 
merit increases and bonuses are given for effective collection efforts by the bank staff. Many 
RFIs provide incentives to borrowers for early or prompt loan repayment through interest rebate, 
increased assurance of new loans and interest discount on new loans.
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Unit banks — RBs and, to some extent, PDBs — are organized for a balanced offering of 
deposit and loan services within their own regulatory restrictions. These RFls tend to show more 
organizational levels, hierarchical in staff relationships, and organizational positions compared to 
branches of KBs. The hierarchical and multi-level structure of unit banks is related to the higher 
overhead cost structure and lower return on asset performance of these banks.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
Faced with a market condition of income regu   —  —  seeks low cost internal
arrangements. If the regime is one of deregulation, RFIs will seek highest portfolio returns while 
keeping low-cost sources of funds. Agricultural loans will decrease if loan interest rates become 
too regulated or if urbanized loans yield more returns under deregulation.
Unit banks (rural banks and private development banks) operate more like community banks, 
serving the deposits and lending needs of the local area. Not similarly oriented to community 
banking are commercial bank and development bank branches, being subject to central 
decisionmaking authority on deposit and loans policy.
The issue of "small" lending portfolio by commercial banks in the local area may be 
associated with a combination of factors like a "clientele" effect, poorly developed loans market 
and a continuing signal from bank head offices that large loans are encouraged. The higher 
salary and cost structures of commercial banks appear to deter them ffom developing their 
branches into community banking. These factors also make larger loans a prerequisite for 
profitability of loan accounts.
Given the current state of small loans market, management’s deployment of its staff into 
loans and deposit functions serve to indicate whether it emphasizes loans or deposits. 
Policymakers interested in periodic assessment of the banking functions of RFIs can avoid the 
high costs of financial audits by looking instead at this surrogate indicator.
The ownership aspect of RFIs appears a key variable in management decisions and RFI 
performance. Innovations must be made regarding traditional ratios. Policy analysts should 
interpret regulations in the light of wider options available to commercial banks toward a better 
understanding of intended effects.
There is an impression that certain current conditions must be addressed to bring about an 
organized development of the rural financial system. One pertains to the competition of 
"restricted" rural banks and "centralized" commercial bank branches. Profit-seeking behavior 
(and restrictions or lack of it) made rural banks more community-based and commercial banks 
more centralized in loans.
The exhortations by policymakers for commercial bank branches to be more "community and 
small business-oriented" will not necessarily be followed by RFIs unless rural loans grow larger. 
A better understanding of branch operations and incentives to owners and managers of rural 
financial institutions should enable government and analysts to understand the impact of planned 
regulations and credit programs.
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"Transaction Cost and the Viability of Rural Financial Intermediaries"
by Teodoro S. Untalan and Carlos E. Cuevas
A vital aspect of the formal financial system, transaction cost affects the bank’s operational 
capability and largely determines the bank’s viability as an intermediary. This paper attempts to 
examine the transaction cost of banks.
Objectives o f the Study
The aims of the study are:
1. To develop a method of estimating transaction cost for each bank activity, i.e., 
lending cost, funds mobilization and general administration; and
2. To explain the differences and the composition of transaction cost among 
commercial banks, private development banks, and rural banks.
Findings
KBs have a larger portion of their transaction cost contributed by funds-mobilization than 
their lending operations. The opposite is true for RBs. PDBs have a balanced operation on both 
funds- mobilization and lending. This emphasizes the fact that KB branches are funds-generating 
units while RBs are more lending oriented.
KBs have a higher percentage of their lending cost accounted for by loan processing 
compared to PDBs and RBs. This may be due to more extensive credit investigation of collateral 
offered among KBs. Loan recovery cost also accounts for a greater share .of lending cost among 
KBs and PDBs.
Among KBs and PDBs, a greater proportion of the transaction cost on funds-mobilization is 
attributed to deposit-mobilization activities. For RBs, the greater portion comes from mobilizing 
funds from the CB rediscounting window.
The cost per outstanding loan is lowest for RBs and highest for KBs. But the cost per peso of 
outstanding loan is lowest for KBs and highest for RBs. The cost of granting a loan is lowest for 
RBs than either PDBs or KBs. The per peso cost of granting a loan, is also lowest for RBs than 
PDBs or KBs, although the differences among the banks are not significant.
The cost of mobilizing each deposit account is higher for KBs and PDBs compared to RBs. 
In contrast, KBs obtain the lowest cost of mobilizing per peso of deposit, followed by PDBs more 
than RBs. This may be attributed to the higher volume of deposits mobilized by both KBs and 
PDBs.
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Policy Implications and Recommendations
The fact that KBs and PDBs have relatively lower cost per peso of loan and cost per peso of 
deposit mobilized than RBs indicates their comparative advantage in both funds-mobilization and 
lending activities. But this does not require smaller banks carrying mostly agricultural loans in 
their portfolio to go into large-scale lending' to reduce their per-peso cost In a related study 
(Untalan 1988), agricultural lending is not a significant determinant of bank transaction cost.
Additional capitalization requirements for smaller banks would permit them to exploit 
economies of scale in their operations. Bigger operating capacity for smaller banks *would lower 
their transaction cost and thus effectively lower their average cost of delivery. Thus, the removal 
of the 25 percent limit on capital subscriptions would enable the bank to expand their capital 
base.
Increased competition in the banking system will be beneficial in reducing transaction cost in 
the long-run since RFIs would be forced to produce these bank services at the lowest possible 
cost to remain profitable. Thus, liberal bank entry should be pursued. This will also allow banks 
to expand their operations and eventually improve their performance through economies of scale.
Improving farm productivity can also be a way to decrease transaction cost of banks as this 
directly lowers the risk faced by banks. Likewise, reducing the risk in credit may be associated 
with improvements in infrastructure such as farm to market roads, irrigation, availability of better 
farm inputs and equipment, better education to farmers of modem techniques of farming, 
marketing assistance, and appropriate pricing policies.
Finally, an improvement in rural household income can be translated in terms of the increase 
in number and size of loans by the banks. Both have decreasing effects in the per-unit and 
per-peso cost of delivery for these rural financial intermediaries.
30
11 The Role and Performance of Cooperative Credit Unions in 
the Rural Financial Markets: Some Preliminary Results"
by Mario B. Lamberte
Objectives o f the Study
This paper presents the partial report of the study on cooperative credit unions (CCUs). The 
specific objectives of the paper are: (1) to briefly review various approaches to analyzing the 
behavior and performance of CCUs; (2) to discuss the performance of the eight rural-based CCUs 
and compare it to that of the ten urban-based CCUs and of the entire banking system; and (3) to 
estimate the demand for CCU shares.
Findings
The growth rates of rural-based CCUs before 1984 were at least comparable with those of the 
urban-based CCUs and the banking system. The balance-of-payments crisis that struck towards 
the latter part of 1983 fell more heavily on the rural- based CCUs. While urban-based CCUs 
bounced back quickly, rural-based CCUs recovered very slowly. However, they proved to be 
more resilient.
The loan portfolio of the eight CCUs averages 90 percent of their total assets. This is not 
surprising since their primary function is to extend credit, and that they are not subject to any 
statutory reserve requirement. In 1987, the average amount of loans granted by these CCUs was 
P3.544. Indeed, rural-based CCUs cater to small borrowers.
Savings mobilized by CCUs are small. Resources of the rural-based CCUs mainly come 
from fixed deposits or share capital. On the average, the share of fixed deposits ranges between 
78 to 84 percent of the total resources during 1981-1987.
Interest on fixed deposits depends on the profits realized by the CCU at the end of the year. 
In certain years, no interest is given on deposits because either profits are low or the CCU has 
certain projects to finance.
Usually, CCUs do not write off loans because this amounts to terminating one’s membership. 
Interviewed CCU officers said they try to improve loan collection and, at the same time, 
reeducate their members. Meantime, with greatly reduced loanable funds, CCUs have resorted to 
queuing.
The demand for credit union shares was estimated, using the ordinary least squares method. 
The linear form yielded the best results among several forms. Income is observed to have a 
statistically significant negative effect on the demand for credit union shares. The implication is 
that members consider credit union shares as an inferior financial asset. This is plausible since 
CCUs are organized primarily to provide low-income individuals/households access to financial 
services. Wealthier individuals/households have more access to the financial services of the 
formal banking system.
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Another factor that yielded significant positive sign is the amount of the most recent loan 
obtained by the members from the credit union. The results suggest that the larger the amount 
one wants to borrow, the higher is his/her demand for credit union shares. This reciprocity 
enjoyed by all CCU members of good standing is perhaps the most important feature 
low-income individuals/households find attractive.
The number of years as a member of the CCU, used as a proxy variable for the degree of 
confidence one attaches to his/her CCU, is found to bear a statistically significant positive effect 
on the demand for credit union shares. Long-time members, who have enjoyed the benefits of 
being CCU members and known fully well its operations, tend to patronize more their own 
CCUs. As a whole, the model can still be improved upon, once the data for other CCUs become 
available.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
CCUs can operate in remote barrios not even reached by rural banks. This indicates their 
great potential in delivering financial services to the small rural enterpreneurs and low- income 
households. Indeed, operating in a small barrio ensures them of obtaining a homogeneous 
membership similar to what institution- and urban-based CCUs are enjoying. Information costs 
and costs in mobilizing deposits and of servicing loan accounts can be kept low wnen members 
are relatively homogeneous and are living or working close to each other.
CCUs can handle more readily the liquidity problem often encountered by unit banks witnout 
any funds transfer operations. This can be done through an interlending scheme, an area where 
government technical support can be given to the CCU system. Similar support can also be 
extended to federations of credit unions providing specific training programs for members in the 
primary cooperatives (i.e., bookkeeping, record-keeping, etc.).
Having CCUs interlinked credit with other markets can achieve the efficiency goal, since 
administrative and risk costs can be reduced, as well as the equity goal, since the benefits can be 
widely distributed to members, unlike the case of banks owned and controlled by a few families.
Finally, some kind of a deposit insurance scheme will allow CCUs to enhance further their 
savings mobilization drive. This will make CCUs less vulnerable to runs on deposits. Aside 




RURAL SAVINGS MOBILIZATION PROJECT
"Deposit Mobilization in Rural Banks: The Impact 
of Alternative Strategies"
by Jocelyn Alma R. Badiola and V. Bruce J. Tolentino
Objectives o f the Study
The study aims to determine the deposit performance of a selected group of rural banks and to 
identify the factors that affect their deposit-generating performance, including the effectiveness of 
specific strategies and conditions. This study seeks to demonstrate the effectiveness of specific 
strategies in mobilizing deposits in rural areas of the Philippines.
Findings
Eighteen rural banks were chosen for the project. Three types of saving schemes/strategies 
were adopted by the participating banks: schemes that motivated bank personnel to solicit 
deposits; strategies that encouraged existing depositors to put in more savings as well to attract 
new savers; and advertising of the deposit handling of banks.
Of the seven rural banks that implemented saving strategies, five registered positive nominal 
growth rates in deposit levels in 1988. The growth rates ranged from 8.1% to 62.8%. In real 
terms, some banks posted low positive growth rates due to: (1) problems in management, 
particularly the long absence of the manager from the bank due to illness; and (2) the absence of 
conscious effort in generating deposits from the community which is especially true for banks 
that concentrated their efforts and resources in recovering past due loans. On the other hand, 
banks with negative growth rates in their deposit levels cited the following reasons: (1) lack of 
commitment towards the implementation of the project; (2) availability of alternative sources of 
loanable funds such as the rediscounting program of the Land Bank of the Philippines; (3) 
negative perception about savings campaigns; (4) heavy withdrawals due to large transactions 
undertaken by bank clients, composed mostly of agricultural entrepreneurs; (5) presence of other 
financial institutions in the municipalities within which the banks operate.
Among participating banks, total cost of mobilizing deposits reached more than PI million or 
an average of P183,000 per bank in 1988. The bulk of the cost came from activities direcdy 
related to transactions with bank clients from the opening of new accounts to over-the-counter 
transactions with depositors in accepting deposits and in withdrawals. The other components of 
costs of deposit mobilization include record-keeping (33%) and advertisements and promotions 
(12%). On a per-account basis, the total cost of mobilizing each deposit account considering all
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banks was P40.00. With respect to the cost per-peso of deposit, P0.029 was estimated for all 
banks.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
This study argues that banks can mobilize savings successfully in the rural areas under certain 
conditions that include an effective savings strategy, a favorable economic environment and a 
strong commitment by bank management with respect to the implementation of the strategy. The 
scheme was one of "mobile banking", where bank staff members personally serviced the deposit 
and withdrawal requirements of clients, cutting down the transaction costs of depositors. Other 
schemes that successfully increased the volume of deposits of rural banks included intensive 
savings campaigns or information drive, gimmicks that offered prizes to depositors such as raffle 
draws, raising or maintaining interest rates at a level much higher than those offered by 
commercial banks and other large banks in nearby towns and cities and giving incentives to bank 
employees to encourage them to solicit deposits from old or new clients. Strategies requiring 
personal contact with the public appeared most effective.
A savings mobilization scheme will however fail if the bank does not enjoy the confidence of 
the public and does not commit itself fully to the implementation of the saving strategy and if the 
public itself remainds indifferent due to prevalent economic difficulties. This implies savings 
mobilization depends on both financial and non-financial factors, including bank stability and a 
favorable economic environment.
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"Interest Rates and Savings Mobilization: 
Empirical Evidence from the Philippines"
by Marife Magno and V. Bruce J. Tolentino
Objectives o f the Study
This paper examines the effect of interest rate on households savings behavior; in particular, 
how it induces rural households to save in financialized form. Financial savings come in various 
forms - stock, bonds, insurance claims, deposits in banks, and cash. Since deposits are the major 
financial instruments in the country, the study specifically looks into the effect of interest rates on 
households’ decision to maintain deposits in financial institutions. The specific objectives are: 
(1) to examine the type of interest rate that affects a household decision to save in banks; (2) to 
determine whether a household response to interest rates differs significantly, given certain 
household attributes (i.e. gross income and level of education); and (3) to examine the effect of 
transaction costs on a household decision to deposit and determine whether this effect varies, 
given certain household attributes.
Findings
Seven regression models were run on household deposit behavior. The first two are logit 
models where the effects of different forms of interest rates and transaction costs are examined. 
The third employed an ordinary least squares (OLS) method to determine the marginal propensity 
to deposit with respect to interest rate. The last four are logit interaction models of interest rates 
and transaction costs vis-a-vis household income level and level of education.
The positive relationship between interest rates and willingness to save in financial 
institutions is observed using normal, real and effective savings deposit rates. However, only the 
nominal and real savings rates are found significant Since the effective rate differs from the real 
rates in terms of the transaction costs, this finding can also be interpreted as the insignificance of 
transaction costs in a household decision to save in bank. This result is contrary to what is 
expected, implying that in general rural households are more attentive to inflation than to 
transaction costs.
While savings interest rate on deposits is noted to be a major factor in a household decision to 
save, it is observed that this rate is not a significant factor in determining the level of deposits of 
households. There are various possible explanations for this. First, rural households are "target 
savers" are those whose deposits are proportionate to the level of income rather than expected 
return. Second, the expected increase in income from a higher savings interest rate may be 
minimal and therefore does not effectively induce households to increase their deposits (that is 
the net income-effeet is negative). Third, rural households are constrained by their income; 
hence, they cannot respond readily to economic incentives. Fourth, the minimal variations in the 
interest rate data contributed to the inability of the model to capture the effect of interest rates.
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Income is a positively and highly significant factor, affecting household decisions to deposit 
When interest rate was allowed to interact with income, the model yielded coefficients not 
statistically significant, indicating that the response of households on interest rates is the same 
across income levels regardless of income status.
Education is noted to have a negative and highly significant effect on a household decision to 
deposit This effect is found consistently for all types of interest rates. This can be explained by 
the fact that highly educated households have a more stable income source and are exposed to 
more consumption and investment opportunities. They are, therefore, faced with more 
alternatives where they can invest their money.
The interaction model on transaction costs and income class reveals that transaction cost is a 
major decision variable for savings. For the low-income earners, transaction cost is found to 
have a significantly negative effect on households* decision to deposit.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The results of this study validate the "interest rate elasticity" hypothesis on the saving 
behavior of households. In particular, the saving deposit rate is noted to have a positive impact 
on the desire of households to hold savings in financialized form and, therefore, becomes an 
important determinant of rural households deposit behavior. Interest rate, however, is noted to 
have no significant effect on the level of deposits of households.
Since inflation and transaction cost directly reduce depositors’ net returns, policies designed 
to minimize the impact of inflation and transaction costs on deposits should be pursued. These 
include eliminating ceilings on interest rates, barriers to branching, gross receipt tax, and loan 
targetting (e.g. PD 717). These policies raise intermediation costs, cause a shortage of loanable 
funds and thus curtail the development of financial intermediation. Likewise, other government 
policies which run counter to the efforts of mobilizing deposits intensively must be reviewed. 
These include the offering of higher interest rates on treasury bills which makes savings and time 
deposits less competitive and thus divert funds from financial intermediaries, and various 
government "liquidity" programs for financial institutions that put savings mobilization efforts in 
second priority. In sum, eliminate regressive financial regulations to increase savings, bring 
down loan interest rates, promote bank expansion and increase investments.
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"Dependency, Education, Attitudes and Household Savings: 
Empirical Evidence from the Philippines"
by Jocelyn Alma R. Badiola
Objective o f the Study
This paper addresses the fundamental question: to what extent do socio-demographic factors 
— particularly, education, dependency, and attitudes — influence household saving behavior in 
the Philippines?
Findings
In this study, two measures of savings were used: (1) total household income less total current 
expenditures plus educational expenses (TOTSAVE); and (2) total deposits in banks and other 
institutions (TOTDEP). With each saving measure, two variants were adopted: total savings and 
per-capita savings. Three variations of dependency were also used particularly: children 
(DEP1); members above 65 years (DEP2); and all unemployed household members regardless of 
age and including those within the "working age group" (HHDEP).
All three variations of dependency were found to exert a significant impact on the level of 
savings but the signs of the coefficients varied according to each definition. Empirical results 
show that children stimulate or encourage saving among households. The possible explanations 
include: (1) household heads highly value the education of their children; (2) household heads 
view saving as the means to prepare their families for any emergency occurrence such as 
shortfalls in income, sickness, death, and the like; and (3) household heads assume multiple jobs 
just so they can sufficiently provide for the needs of their children. On the other hand, the 
variable DEP2 yielded the expected negative sign which supports the life-cycle hypothesis that 
retired individuals earn less and, consequently, drain household savings. The variable HHDEP 
also yielded the expected negative sign.
On financialized savings, the empirical results show that none of the dependency variables 
showed a significant influence on the level of deposits, although these variables yielded the 
expected negative sign.
While education was found with a significant influence on household savings, it yielded a 
negative sign contrary to an expected positive impact By educational level, household heads 
who either reached or completed the elementary level tend to save more than those with a college 
or higher level of education. On the other hand, education did not exert a notable influence on 
the level of financialized savings.
The dummy variable for attitudes, specified as the attitude of household heads toward saving 
in banks, was also entered into the saving models. The variable yielded statistically significant 
negative sign, implying that households preferring to save in banking institutions hold lesser 
surplus funds. In particular, households that realize the importance of saving in banks hold
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lesser surplus funds primarily because they are more aware ot the various forms to hold their 
savings including education, bank deposits, consumer durables and housing, among others.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
While non-economic factors may be less responsive and manipulative to government policies 
than economic variables, a comprehensive and complementary set of policies addressing both 
economic and non-economic issues must be formulated to ensure an effective savings 
mobilization program in the countryside.
Since education of children is highly valued by rural households motivating them to save 
more, certain saving schemes-to link bank deposits to educational plans or insurance may be 
undertaken. Strategies like providing special educational plans with relatively lower premiums to 
those maintaining a certain deposit amount may attract households to save in banks. Similarly, 
encouraging rural households to save may be achieved by: (1) increasing yields through higher 
interest rates and the use of tax policy (e.g. removing withholding tax on interest income); (2) 
increasing confidence of households in financial institutions and making them more accessible; 
(3) disseminating information as part of savings promotion and linking it to acquisition of goods 
(e.g. housing, education); and (4) protecting savings and investments against loss of value 
through inflation. Moreover, classroom teaching must incorporate a course on rural finance to 
orient students on the importance of savings mobilization vis-a- vis the rural financial market and 
rural development
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"Income, Savings and Deposit Performance: 
Evidence Among Rural Households in the Philippines"
by Flerida Chan and V. Bruce J. Tolentino
Objective o f the Study
This paper attempts to describe the nature of financialized savings behavior of rural 
households in the Philippines. The relationship between financialized savings and income, 
focusing not only on farm households but also on non-farm households will be analyzed. Some 
of the questions dealt with in this paper include:
1. Is income the most significant determinant of the level of deposits amoung rural 
households?
2. In what way does the level of income affect the households deposits behavior?
3. How does the source of income influence the level of financialized savings among 
households?
4. Do farmers save more than professionals?
5. Do wage-eamers save more than self- employed households?
6. In what forms do rural households save?
7. Does the form of saving vary across income sources?
In this study, two analytical procedures were applied for the deposit model. Logit regression 
was employed to predict the probability of a household having bank deposits. Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) was applied to determine the effect of income on the level of financial savings.
Regression estimates obtained from a linear savings function for the 974 households 
categorized by major occupation of household heads show that their marginal savings 
propensities out of current income ranged from 16 to 60 percent. Fishermen obtained the highest 
marginal propensity to save. In terms of income sources, non-agriculture is higher than 
agriculture, while employed is higher than self-employed. With regards to the latter, this implies 
one of two things: (1) the regularity and fixity of income of employed persons may have 
encouraged them to set aside an amount for savings; and (2) for self-employed households, the 
preference to invest in their trade/businesses rather than save may be stronger, given that deposit 
rate is close to negative in real terms.
The study also tested several model specifications using various definitions of income to 
determine which income definition best explains the households’ savings performance, namely: 
(1) current income; and (2) permanent/transitory income. For the pure income model, the current 
income variable yielded statistically significant positive sign. Regression estimates using dummy 
variables based on the occupational categories of the household head (with wage earners 
[OCCUP5] as the reference point) indicate that four categories have significant coefficients, those
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for OCCUP1 (farmers), OCCUP2 (fishermen), OCCUP4 (farm laborers) and OCCUP7 
("others"). This means that at the same income levels farmers, fishermen, farm laborers and 
households whose major occupations are classified as "others" save more than the rest of the 
occupational categories.
Empirical results also show that the variables permanent (Yp) and transitory (Yt) income 
yielded statistically significant positive signs. The coefficient of the transitory income variable, 
however, is higher than that of the permanent income variable implying that households save 
more out of transitory income. Likewise, almost the same results were obtained for the 
occupational dummies.
Other relevant factors that could influence savings decisions were included such as interest 
rates (INT), dependency ratio ((DEPR), and educational attainment (EDUC) to determine how 
other non-income related factors affect household savings behavior. In both regression models 
using current income and permanent/transitory income, only the dependency ratio variable 
yielded statistically significant collect sign.
The empirical results of the logit regression model show that income is significant factor in 
the deposit decisions of households. Other factors which were found to be significant in 
household decision to deposit are education, and interest rates. While the logit regression model 
indicates that the interest rate affects the households’ decision to save, the OLS methods indicate 
otherwise. Several implications can be inferred from these results. When deposit decisions are 
made, households can rely more on income rather than on the expected returns on such 
investments. In addition, when households are limited by minimal income increases, they may 
fail to respond to economic activities.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The results of the study suggest that given a more "stable" source of income, a larger 
proportion of income is saved as deposits. It may be that income sustained for a longer period 
encourages households to deposit.
Government efforts should focus on policies and programs designed to strengthen income 
and also provide alternative income- increasing livelihood opportunities in rural areas. These 
employment opportunities should not, however, be limited to agriculture or farm-related activities 
since earnings from non- agricultural undertakings make up a significant proportion in the total 
income of rural households. Nevertheless, increases in non-agricultural income should not hinder 
improvements in agricultural productivity. Improvements in agricultural productivity can be 
brought about by, among others, massive infrastructure and support services that would move 
employment opportunities to the rural areas and encouraging urban-based business firms to invest 
and expand in the countryside.
A large proportion of the total assets of the rural households is still in physical form. Thus, 
strategies to transform these assets in financialized form should be pursued. Banks, together with 
informal institutions, may be tapped as the primary channels and mobilizers of deposits in rural 
areas. Any savings strategy that should be adopted by banks to tap the savings potential of rural 
households must also operate under a favorable economic environment and a strong commitment 
by bank management to implement such strategy.
Finally, policies which discourage the transformation of savings into financial form must be 
reviewed. These include the policy imposing taxes on interest income from financial savings.
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"The Saying and Deposit Performance of Philippine Rural Households: 
Advanced vs. Backward Areas"
by Raquel Garde Jesus and V. Bruce j. Tolentino
Objectives o f  the Study
The basic question wtucn tne study attempts to answer is: Does the level of economic 
development of a given rural region or area significantly affect the deposit performance of die 
households in that area? The study therefore hypothesizes: the more developed an area is, the 
greater the level of savings/deposits of the households in the area.
The study examines the data and, using some indicators, ranks or classifies the areas 
according to level of development Specifically, the paper documents differences in the savings 
as well as deposit behavior/performance of rural households; explains the disparities, if any, of 
the savings and deposit performance in relatively advanced and backward areas; and derives 
some policy implications from the results of the study.
Findings
The general ecojiojnetric model used in the analysis is based on the assumption that 
household saving is a two-staged decision process: the household decides on how much to save 
and to allocate to financial deposits. Thus, two econometric models were formulated: total 
household saving (SAVE) and financialized deposits (DEPO). Furthermore, two variants of the 
household saving model were considered: the model >vhich does not consider bank accessibility 
(SAVE1) and the model which considers bank accessibility (SAVE2). Likewise, two variants of 
the financialized deposits model were considered: DEPOl using total deposits for the period 
(flow) and DEP02 using outstanding deposits balances as of the period (stock).
The regression results show that, in both variants of the household saving model, the 
variables nominal income (NY) and dependency rate (DEP) yielded the correct significant signs. 
The dummy variable for economic development (DUM=1 for advanced and DUM*G for 
backward) yielded the correct significant sign in the model when bank accessibility is not 
considered. Nonetheless, this supports the hypothesis put forward in the study, Le., that the 
economic development of an area exerts an influence on the savings behavior of households. 
Empirical results also show households in advanced areas are dissaving but households in 
backward areas had positive savings. The unexpected result reveals households in advanced 
areas have to reach a certain "threshold" income before positive savings occur. Economic 
development therefore may not necessarily induce households to maintain surplus funds 
Although opportunities for additional income and exposure to banking operations may have 
increased with progress along with an anticipated increment in savings, these did little to 
influence savings behavior of households. It is possible that economic development instead 
exposed the households to a wide array of consumer/investment goods and services and 
magnified the "pull factor" on income.
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The results for income validate the positive influence that income exerts on total household 
savings. Likewise, the number of dependents of households exerts a negative influence on their 
savings behavior. On the other hand, the variable on education yielded a negative sign. One 
explanation for this is the popular treatment of education as a form of savings, i.e., rural 
households save in the form of education since it enhances the ability to earn and reduces the 
precautionary motive of savings.
The empirical results on the financial deposits model in both variants show that only income 
(Y) — or alternatively, wealth (W) — constitutes the most important variable that influences 
portfolio decisions of the households.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The effect of progress is suspected to be more pronounced on the consumption side, 
supporting the findings of other researchers. Given this constraint, rural savings mobilization may 
be more effective if the financial/capital market can provide the households with investment 
opportunities to sustain income increases, and/or provide sources of funds (e.g. loans) that will 
finance the increased consumption levels as the household moves from a "backward" to an 
"advanced" state. This seems consistent with the requirement for "financial deepening" 
complementary to the economic development process.
Contrary to expectations, the study shows that interest rate increases and higher levels of 
education may not necessarily induce households to save out of income or keep these savings in 
financial forms. Interest rate has one major implication on savings mobilization efforts of banks. 
Banks should recognize the significance of other alternative strategies such as reduction of 
requirements, accommodating personnel, less formal transactions, raffles, and promotions in 
encouraging rural households to save and keep their money in banks. These strategies may prove 
more effective than pegging interest rates a few percentage points higher. More often, providing 
households with more opportunities to augment income and reduce dependency of their members 
is an effective way to promote rural savings.
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ANNEX III
CREDIT UNIONS STUDY 
"Credit Unions: An Underrated Mode of Mobilizing 
and Allocating Resources in Rural Areas"
by Mario £ . Lambeite, Julius P. Relampagos, and Douglas H. Graham
Objective o f the Study
The role of the cooperative credit union (CCU) system has not yet been fully understood nor 
appreciated. This study tries to contribute to the understanding of the behavior of one segment of 
the cooperative movement Specifically, the paper analyzes the performance of CCUs in the 
rural areas. Since CCUs* performance depends to a certain degree on borrowing and saving 
patterns of members, this paper also examines such patterns from a sample of 200 CCU 
members. This study limits itself to eight sample CCUs located in Batangas, Laguna, and 
Pangasinan. These are the areas where some of the sample banks in the Comparative Bank Study 
jointly conducted by ACPC, PIDS, and OSU were selected.
Findings
Volatility has been observed in outstanding real assets of the eight CCUs. There are at least 
two reasons for the unsustainability of the growth in the real assets of CCUs: the excessive 
reliance on fixed deposits and the high incidence of overdue loans. The growth in fixed deposits 
hinges on three factors — growth of CCU membership, loan ceiling imposed by the CCUs, return 
a credit union will give the fixed deposits.
Two the CCUs do not accept savings deposits. Likewise, only 48 percent of the sample CCU 
members have savings deposits in their respective CCUs with the maximum average outstanding 
savings deposit of P2,005. Indeed, savings deposits of members are small. One reason for 
maintaining small savings deposits is that this account cannot be used to increase one’s loan 
capacity. For some credit unions, it is a standard operating procedure to require members to 
convert their savings deposits into fixed deposit, if they want to increase their loan capacity.
A collateral is generally not required by credit unions from member-borrowers. However, in 
case the amount of loan is extremely high and/or is beyond the borrower’s loan capacity, a 
collateral may be required. In most cases, a borrower is required to have one co-maker. Seldom 
do credit unions disapprove loan applications. This was experienced by only three respondents. 
Normally, a credit union reduces the amount of loan approved, especially if there is a lot of 
pending loan applications instead of outright disapproval of the loan application.
The demand for credit union shares was estimated in this paper. The standard model of the 
demand for financial assets is being followed with some modifications to consider unique
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characteristics of the financial instruments used by CCUs. Ordinary least squares (OLS) method 
was used in all the empirical testing.
Empirical results show the interest rate on fixed deposits has a significant positive effect on 
the demand for credit union shares as expected. This suggests that members increase fixed 
deposits due to a higher interest rate on such financial instrument. However, the estimated 
coefficients in all models using logarithmic form are far below one, suggesting that the demand 
for credit union shares is interest elastic. The demand for credit as represented by the amount of 
last loan has a statistically significant positive effect on credit union shares. This implies that 
members tend to increase fixed deposits if they raise the loan amount from the credit union.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
Empirical results indicate that borrowing from the credit union exerts a positive influence in 
increasing the demand for fixed deposit. This has an important implication on rural savings 
mobilization. Given the present problem of inadequate supply of formal credit in the rural sector, 
rural savers can be encouraged to save and patronize a CCU in order to haye access to credit 
union’s borrowing privileges. This emphasizes the important role of CCUs in providing the 
essential financial services needed in the rural areas.
While internal problems pose an obstacle to the growth of CCUs, thd lack of initiative to 
innovate poses a greater obstacle. In light of their expanding role in rural savings mobilization, 
CCUs must introduce new innovations in mobilizing savings deposits from their members. This 
requires the ability of the CCUs to effectively maintain low transactions cost associated with 
infrequent saving and frequent withdrawals of savings deposit accounts of members. This also 
requires employment of full-time staff to service deposits and withdrawals of members anytime. 
Likewise, as CCUs expand, the need for alternative sources of funds, like savings and time 
deposits, becomes inevitable.
In light of existing detiquency problems of the credit cooperatives, it is prudent to proceed 
with caution in mulling over the idea of making them conduits of lending programs in rural areas 
to avoid repeating the experience of the rural banking system. Despite their loan delinquency 
problems, CCUs are still relatively successful in mobilizing deposits in rural areas because of a 
unique system in dealing with depositors and borrowers. This makes their overall operation 
sustainable. Thus, it must be emphasized that making CCUs conduits in allocating resources 
should not undermine their savings mobilization efforts.
The question of supervision over cooperatives deserves equal attention. CCUs have the 
potential to grow into bigger financial institutions and, like formal financial institutions, can 
expand their areas of operation. In this regard, supervision of cooperatives should be placed 
under an appropriate agency or institution that can help their operations and address their own 
internal problems, and not a venue for serving other agenda and interests.
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